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CoRPORATioNs-SALE oF AssETs As A MEANs oF AvomING STATE CoNSTITUTIONAL L!MrrATION ON CORPORATE LIFE-Defendant, a Michigan corporation, was incorporated in 1923 for a term of thirty years, the maximum
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term pennitted by the Michigan constitution.1 Shortly before this thirty-year
term was to expire, majority and minority stockholders engaged in unsuccessful
negotiations, each group attempting to purchase the other's interest in the
corporation. A special stockholders' meeting was then called to consider a
proposed renewal of the corporate term. This proposal failed to gamer the vote
of two-thirds of the outstanding shares which was required for approval. 2 The
attorneys representing the majority shareholders proceeded to organize a dummy
corporation, which in tum offered the entire issue of its corporate stock to
defendant corporation in consideration for all of the assets of defendant corporation. Defendant corporation, by a majority vote, accepted this offer.3 The
newly acquired stock was distributed among the shareholders of defendant
corporation, and thus the majority stockholders in effect caused defendant corporation to extend its corporate life for another thirty-year term. A request by
the minority shareholders for an injunction prohibiting the sale of the entire
assets of defendant corporation was dismissed by the circuit court. On appeal,
held, affirmed. The acts of defendant corporation were constitutional and
sanctioned by the Michigan General Corporation Act. Porter 11. C.O. Porter
Machinery Co., 336 Mich. 437, 58 N.W. (2d) 135 (1953).
At common law, the general rule is that a single shareholder may restrain
a sale of the entire assets of a corporation.4 Michigan and other states, have
enacted statutes relaxing this common law requirement and providing that a
prescribed portion of the stockholders may approve the sale of all or substantially
all of the corporate assets.5 The purpose of these statutes is to prevent a small
minority from forestalling corporate action which is desired by the overwhelming
majority.6 However, it is doubtful that the Michigan legislature intended its
statute to be used as a means of circumventing the Michigan constitution7 and
provisions enacted pursuant to this constitution.8 The state supreme court
rejected the argument that extension of corporate life by the sale of assets on the
basis of majority approval is in contravention of the state constitution.9 The
1 M:rcH. CoNST., art. XII, §3, states: "No corporation shall be created for a period
longer than 30 years, • • • but the legislature may provide by general laws • . • for I or
more extensions of the term of such corporations • • • on the consent of not less than %
of the capital stock of the corporation••••"
2 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §450.60 provides: "Any stock corporation whose term is
about to expire by limitation, may • • • by the consent of the holders of at least % of its
outstanding shares • • • direct the continuance of its corporate existence for such further
term as permitted by law, as may be expressed in a resolution for that purpose."
3 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §450.57 provides: ''Every corporation ••• may sell •••
all or substantially all of its property and assets • • • for such consideration, which may
be in whole or in part shares of stock in, and/or other securities of, any other corporation •••
as its board of directors shall deem expedient and for the best interests of the corporation,
when and as authorized by the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the shares
issued and outstanding.•••"
4 6A FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. §2947 (1950).
5 Note 3 supra.
6 BALLANTINB, CORPORATIONS 668 (1946).
7 Note 1 supra.
s Note 2 supra.
9 Note I supra.
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court described its decision as an interpretation of the constitution which adapts
it to the necessities of a changing law. A more accurate description is that the
court simply read the applicable provision out of the state constitution. The
stockholders of defendant corporation are parties to a contract, the terms of
which contain the Michigan constitution,10 the renewal statute,11 and the
statute authorizing the sale of corporate assets on majority approval.12 When
interpreting contract provisions, the courts are supposed to give effect to the
reasonable expectations of the parties.13 Thus the question is whether the
stockholders of defendant corporation contemplated approval of an extension
of corporate life by a two-thirds or a majority vote of the outstanding shares.
It seems most likely that the stockholders placed their emphasis on the constitutional provision, and contemplated extending the corporate life only on
the approval of two-thirds of the shareholders. As a practical result of the
decision in the principal case, however, the majority stockholders are afforded
a ready means of frustrating these contractual expectations by circumventing the
constitutional requirement. It is difficult to discover a sound policy basis for
the limitation imposed by the Michigan constitution; it would appear that the
provision has lingered on from the days of general hostility toward the corporate
form of business association. The lack of underlying policy may well be the
motivation which caused the Michigan Supreme Court to strike this provision
such a telling blow.

Judson M. Werbelow

10 Ibid.
11 Note

2 supra.
12Note 3 supra; Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.)
518 (1819).
.
131 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §1 (1950); 3 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §538 (1950); Moulton
v. Lobdell-Emery Mfg. Co., 322 Mich. 307, 33 N.W. (2d) 804 (1948).

